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THE CURIOUS CRYPTO QUESTION: DO PATENTS 
ADVANCE FINTECH INNOVATION? THE PARADOX 
ARISING FROM FIVE KEY RECENT TRENDS 
 
 
By Chris J. Katopis1 
 
The Author examines some recent trends in intellectual property 
(U.S. patents) in the fintech sector, summarizes this empirical data, 
and discusses the potential implications of these developments.  
 
“As new technologies emerge and the financial services 
industry puts those technologies to use, Congress must make 
sure that responsible innovation is encouraged, and that 
regulators and the law are adapting to the changing 
landscape to best protect consumers, investors and small 
businesses.” 2 
 
The Hon. Maxine Waters 
(D-CA), chair of the U.S. 
House of Representatives 





      
1 The author is of Counsel at Franklin, Scott, Conway LLP. He recently served 
as a Senior Legal Advisor at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. He has 
previously served in other governmental roles, including as law clerk to the 
Hon. Pauline Newman, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and as 
counsel to the U.S. House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, 
and Intellectual Property. B.S., 1990, University of Pennsylvania, School of 
Engineering and Applied Sciences; J.D., 1994, Temple University Law 
School. The views and opinions expressed within this article should be 
attributed to the author, rather than to any client, agency, or other entity. 
2 Press Release, U.S. House Committee on Financial Services, Waters 
Announces Committee Task Forces on Financial Technology and Artificial 
Intelligence (May 9, 2019), 
https://financialservices.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID
=403738; see also Douglas Clark, House committee task forces on Fintech, 
AI established, FIN. REG. NEWS (May 14, 2019), 
https://financialregnews.com/house-committee-task-forces-on-fintech-ai-
established/. 
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The revolution in financial services technology (“fintech”) is 
driven by many factors, including technological innovation, 
government regulation, and stakeholder demand. This fintech 
revolution promises to be disruptive, innovative, beneficial, and 
potentially messy. The many voices in the fintech debate range from 
congressional policymakers to state and federal regulators, from 
standard-setting organizations and marketplace entities to the end 
consumers. As the fintech revolution rages on, patents are likely to play 
an increasingly significant role, if not a material factor. First, this 
article relies on empirical data to examine some recent legal trends 
related to patent activity that may explain whether patents materially 
advance fintech innovation. Second, the article assesses the impact of 
patent-related activity to determine whether it has a net positive or 
negative influence. For many industry stakeholders, if the first question 
is whether fintech is the next big thing, then the next question is 
whether related patent litigation is the next, next big thing. 
 This article considers several recent important developments, 
federal public policy initiatives, and empirical data to analyze patents’ 
role as a potential driver of fintech innovation. Washington, D.C., is 
the center of gravity for these matters, given the U.S. Constitution’s 
governance, the current operative legislative frameworks, and the 
regulatory agency review. Appropriately, Congresswoman Maxine 
Waters (D-CA), chair of the House Financial Services Committee, is 
among the many lawmakers asking the question, “How do we get more 
innovation from the financial services industry?”3  
Patents, which are rooted in the U.S. Constitution,4 are a form 
of legal protection for inventions, rather than mere concepts or ideas, 
such as scientific principles or the concept of basic human economic 
interactions. The U.S. Congress enacted the first Patent Act in 1790.5 
Patents are considered an indicator of innovation, as will be discussed 
      
3 See generally Press Release, U.S. Committee on Financial Services, Waters 
Outlines Agenda in First Policy Speech as Committee Chairwoman (Jan. 16, 
2019), 
https://financialservices.house.gov/news/email/show.aspx?ID=LSOOG4ZW
MHVGE (“[I]t is important that we encourage responsible innovation with 
the appropriate safeguards in place to protect consumers and without 
displacing community banks and credit unions.”). 
4 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”). 
5 See The Patent Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109. 
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in further detail below. Recent empirical evidence shows a dramatic 
increase in patent-related activity surrounding fintech, including new 
worldwide fintech patent applications and government grants of these 
patent rights.6 This evidence suggests that patents play some role in 
fintech innovation and investment, if not an indicator of this activity. 
Although, the full extent is unclear.  
Patents remain a controversial form of legal protection, despite 
a long history and tradition dating back to the writing of the U.S. 
Constitution. Legal historians and economists often teach that the 
modern patent system, rooted in the 18th century, has long played a 
significant role in advancing various technological fields.7 Many in the 
academic community argue that the essence of the patent system is 
about balancing incentives and public benefits, such as the disclosure 
of useful knowledge.8 The argument is often presented as follows:  
 
The historical and philosophical underpinning of 
intellectual property show that its purpose is to provide 
a narrowly tailored, private monopoly privilege as an 
      
6 See, e.g., European Patent Office, Talking About a New Revolution: 




7 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 255–57, 435–
38 (2d ed. 1985) (“Monopoly was in bad odor in 1776, except for the special 
case of the patent, which served as an incentive for technical innovation.”); 
Abraham Lincoln, Second Lecture on Discoveries and Inventions, in THE 
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 356, 363 (Roy P. Basler et al. eds. 
1953) (explaining that patents are intended to add “the fuel of interest to the 
fire of genius” by granting inventors exclusive rights in their inventions); 
Robert P. Merges, The Hamiltonian Origins of the U.S. Patent System, and 
Why They Matter Today, 104 IOWA L. REV. 2559 (2019) (“The patent system 
was one of the earliest instruments of economic development put in place by 
the young United States. It represents a distinctly pre-twentieth century 
policy—one of the strands in the sturdy rope that pulled the early Republic 
forward into prosperity.”) 
8 Elliot C. Cook & Darren M. Jiron, Patents Are Business Tools for CyberTech 
Companies, Not Trophies, HAARETZ CYBER MAG. (June 2016), 
https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/articles/patents-are-business-tools-
for-cybertech-companies-not-trophies.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2021); Seth 
Fiegerman, In Tech, Patents are Trophies – and These Companies are 
Dominating, CNN (June 19, 2018), 
https://money.cnn.com/2018/06/19/technology/tech-patents/index.html. 




incentive to produce various types of works for the 
public good.9  
 
The general proposition of the public-private bargain 
embodied in the U.S. Constitution is that patents confer a limited 
private benefit in exchange for sharing the fundamental knowledge of 
the invention with the public.10 Patent advocates further argue that in 
the absence of patent protection, the innovators would turn to trade 
secret protection to secure their inventions providing sub-optimal 
societal benefits, instead of the teaching of valuable technology 
through public disclosure.11 Judge Pauline Newman of the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit defined “technological innovation” 
broadly as the process of “advancing the useful arts.”12 For Judge 
Newman, patents are a vital tool and part of the constitutionally based 
right that “carries the obligation to disclose the workings of the 
invention . . . [that adds] to the store of knowledge without diminishing 
the patent-supported incentive to innovate.”13 
Some observers find it easy to accept the application of such 
patent principles to Industrial Age inventions such as Edison’s 
lightbulb or the Wright Brothers’ plane.14 In contrast, many modern 
      
9 Chris J. Katopis, Patients v. Patients?: Policy Implications of Recent Patent 
Legislation, 71 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 329, 332 (1997) (hereinafter Katopis, 
Patients v. Patents). 
10 See, e.g., id. at 332 (“The ‘storehouse theory’ states that the disclosure under 
the patent system a first inventor contributes ‘a measure of worthwhile 
knowledge’ so as to ‘enlarge[] the public storehouse of knowledge.’”). 
11 Id. at 338; see also PETER D. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS 
1–45 (2d ed. 1996) (explaining that under trade secret law, an inventor who 
keeps his invention secret may enjoy de facto exclusivity and may rely on 
state enforcement of nondisclosure agreements); Adam D. Moore, Intellectual 
Property and the Prisoner’s Dilemma: A Game Theory Justification of 
Copyrights, Patents, and Trade Secrets, 28 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA 
& ENT. L.J. 831, 849 (2018) (“If innovators would be motivated to create 
independent of compensation and in spite of being able to recoup investment 
costs, then copying would not lead to a suppression of content creation and a 
sub-optimal outcome . . . [i]t should be obvious that such considerations 
would inevitably lead content creators to deploy their efforts in less risky 
pursuits.”). 
12 Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
13 Id. 
14 See generally U.S. Patent No. 223,898. (issued Jan. 27, 1880) (Edison’s 
lightbulb (“Electric Lamp”)); U.S. Patent No. 821,393 (issued May 22, 1906) 
(the Wright Brothers plane (“Flying-machine”)). 
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critics argue the incentives of the traditional patent system are simply 
out of date and incapable of meeting the needs of the fast-paced world 
of technology, let alone the needs of the Fourth Industrial Revolution.15 
This revolution promises cutting-edge advances such as, artificial 
intelligence, the Internet of Things (IoT), and the fintech sector. Patent 
advocates argue that patents can serve as a valuable asset class for all 
industries when ventures raise capital and secure investment. 
Innovation is an expensive proposition, especially for poorly 
capitalized entrepreneurs and start-ups. In the fintech context, financial 
industry experts estimate that the development of a new financial 
product can range in cost from $50,000 to $5 million.16 
History teaches us that patent protection on banking and 
financial services-related inventions has a long pedigree and certainly 
is a practical reality.17 The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) 
is among the sources that cite the long historical precedent of patents 
for such inventions. The method of “Detecting Counterfeit Notes” 
(1799) and “A Mode of Preventing Counterfeiting” (1815) are among 
some of the earliest examples.18 These financial services-related “tech” 
patents remain controversial more than a century later for various 
reasons. Some critics question whether the legal protection normally 
afforded to technology and the follow-on incentives are applicable in 
the business world.19 It is a fundamental public policy and economic 
question whether such protection is appropriate for the entire category 
of financial related activity.20 The debate about affording patent 
protection to other sectors of the economy has raged for decades.21 
More than a century ago, the U.S. Congress observed: 
 
No one has advanced a just and logical reason why 
reward for service to the public should be extended to 
      
15 Don Tiller, Comment, Devaluing Invention: The Push for Patent Reform, 
14 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 119 (2007). 
16 Peter Tufano, Financial Innovation and First-Mover Advantages, 25 J. OF 
FIN. ECON. 213, 213–40 (1989). 
17 See generally Michael Risch, America’s First Patents 64 FLORIDA L. REV. 
1279 (2012); see Dickinson, infra note 76. 
18 John Kneas, Text of Patent for White Paper on Business Methods Patents: 
Bank Note Printing., U.S. PAT. TRADEMARK OFF., 
https://web.archive.org/web/20061231223224/http://www.uspto.gov/web/m
enu/busmethp/x2301.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2021) (An archived copy of 
the material can be found in December 2006). 
19 Ricardo Bonilla, A Patented Lie: Analyzing the Worthiness of Business 
Method Patents After Bilski v. Kappos, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1285 (2011). 
20 Id. 
21 Roman Perchyts, Business Method Patents: Let the Ptab Kill Them All? A 
Case for Narrow Reading of CBM Review Eligibility, U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & 
POL’Y, Fall 2018, at 433. 




the inventor of a mechanical toy and denied to the 
genius whose patience, foresight, and effort have given 
a valuable new [discovery] to mankind.22 
 
In truth, the global financial services industry appears to have 
a love-hate relationship with patents. Critics of patents in financial 
services fields, such as business method patents, argue that there are 
numerous reasons not to afford them any such legal protection, 
including the shifting legal standards around patentability; the 
inevitably poor quality of patent claims; the expense of procuring 
patents; the difficulty of enforcement; vexing, specious litigation; and, 
a lack of consensus within the traditional banking regulatory regime.  
The fintech community is clearly of two minds when it comes 
to patents. The digital currency Bitcoin, for example, is considered 
open source and unpatentable by design.23 In contrast, we have also 
seen both traditional businesses and start-ups engaging in a virtual, 
digital gold rush and chasing patent claims.24 At the time of this 
Article’s 2021 publication, the USPTO has granted more than 2,100 
patents expressly claiming “blockchain”-related inventions and more 
than 100 expressly claiming “bitcoin.”25 In 2020, Square, Inc. made 
      
22 Hearings on H.R. 11372 Before the House Comm. On Patents, 71st Cong. 
3, at 2 (1930). 
23 See Patent Pledge FAQ, BLOCKSTREAM’S DEFENSIVE PATENT STRATEGY, 
https://blockstream.com/about/patent_faq/ (responding affirmatively to a 
question whether “Bitcoin is both open-source and unpatentable. The original 
ideas as published in the Bitcoin whitepaper were not patented. Inventors have 
a year after making their inventions public to file patent applications, and then 
the window is closed. Because of this, the basic Bitcoin system is free of 
patent restrictions; it is too late for anyone to come forward and apply for new 
patents on Bitcoin now. What can still be patented are the incremental 
improvements, complementary technologies, or additional applications of the 
technologies that are currently being developed.”). 
24 Seth Cronin, The Blockchain Patent Gold Rush, IPCAPITAL GROUP BLOG 
(Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.ipcg.com/the-blockchain-patent-gold-rush/ (last 
visited Sept. 25, 2021) (“Much like the California Gold Rush of 1850s, the 
enticing opportunity of blockchain’s potential to revolutionize global 
financial (and many other) markets through transaction security has brought 
a wave of prospectors to stake their claim on the blockchain patent 
landscape.”). 
25 Querying Results from Keyword Text Search of “Blockchain” and 
“Bitcoin” within the Field of Patent Claims, U.S. PAT. TRADEMARK OFF. PAT. 
FULL-TEXT AND IMAGE DATABASE, 
https://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-bool.html (last visited June 27, 
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news when it was issued a significant patent covering a 
“cryptocurrency payment network.”26 The company’s patent abstract 
teaches that: 
 
The present technology provides a payment service for 
providing financial transactions between a customer 
and merchant wherein the customer can pay in any 
currency and the merchant can be paid in any currency. 
Furthermore, the present technology supports payment 
using cryptocurrency, while improving such 
transactions in a way that takes advantage of benefits of 
such transactions while overcoming drawbacks such as 
delays in processing.27 
 
As of the date of this article’s publication, Square, Inc. has 
secured more than 600 U.S. patents across all fields of technology.28  
 In 2020, observers noted that many of the key crypto 
industry players earned patents, including Bank of America, which was 
the recipient of 36 new blockchain patents.29 Bank of America earned 
U.S. Patent No. 10,643,202, entitled “Real-time processing distributed 
ledger system.”30 Craig Wright’s nChain Holdings Limited also 
recently earned four blockchain patents.31 A recent nChain patent, U.S. 
Patent No. 10,579,779, is entitled “Method and system for verifying 
integrity of a digital asset using a distributed hash table and a peer-to-
peer distributed ledger.”32 
      
2021) (follow link to access USPTO Patent Database; then independently 
input a quoted keyword of “Blockchain” or “Bitcoin” in the “Term 1” textbox; 
then select the “Claim(s)” option within the “Field 1” dropdown menu; then 
select the “Search” button; then repeat the process with the other quoted 
keyword). 
26 See generally U.S. Patent No. 10,540,639 (issued Jan. 21, 2020) (Invention 
assigned to Square, Inc. (“Cryptocurrency payment network”)). 
27 Id. 
28 Querying Results from Keyword Text Search of “Square, Inc” within the 
Field of Patent Assignee Name, U.S. PAT. TRADEMARK OFF. PAT. FULL-TEXT 
AND IMAGE DATABASE, https://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-
bool.html (last visited July 16, 2021) (follow link to access USPTO Patent 
Database; then input “Square, Inc” in the “Term 1” textbox; then select 
“Assignee Name” option within the “Field 1” dropdown menu; then select the 
“Search” button). 
29 Thomas Isaacson, The Blockchain Patent Landscape Shows Accelerating 
Growth, IPWATCHDOG (Dec. 4, 2020), 
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2020/12/04/the-blockchain-patent-landscape-
shows-accelerating-growth/id=127922/. 
30 See U.S. Patent No. 10,643,202-B2 (issued May 5, 2020). 
31 Isaacson, supra note 29. 
32 U.S. Patent No. 10,579,779 (issued March 3, 2020). 




Bank of America, nChain, and Square are in good company, as 
a number of leading companies are obtaining patents on fintech 
innovations, including blockchain. It is notable that Chinese 
companies like Alibaba Group Holdings currently appear to be leading 
the patent gold rush.33 The charts below illustrate some of these recent 
activities by domestic and overseas entities seeking patents protection 
in the U.S. and countries around the world. 
 










      
33 Rocky Berndsen, Titans of Technology: Blockchain / The Top Companies 
in Blockchain Patents 2021, HARRITY & HARRITY, https://harrityllp.com/top-
companies-in-blockchain-patents/ (active worldwide patents and pending 
applications as of September 1, 2021). 
34 Id. 
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Chart 2: Blockchain Patents and Applications for Top 45 Filers35 
 
 
The Article now identifies five major recent trends driving 
events related to patents surrounding fintech and crypto innovation. 
These trends span the past decade, but the last few years were 
especially significant for a variety of reasons discussed below.  
I. TREND ONE: THE U.S. PATENT OFFICE CONTINUES TO GRANT 
A RECORD NUMBER OF PATENTS ANNUALLY 
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) is a federal 
agency whose duties primarily involve the examination of patent 
applications and the issuance of patents.36 The USPTO has been 
labeled as a gatekeeper of technological innovation.37 The agency is 
considered as one granting private property rights in an invention; 
nevertheless, it can still be considered a federal regulator.38 The agency 
is not an enforcement agency per se, inter alia, in that it does not make 
determinations of patent infringement or award remedies such as 
monetary damages.39 The agency is in the business of examining 
      
35 Overview of the Patent Landscape in the Blockchain, Cryptocurrency, and 




36 See U.S. PAT. TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/ (last visited Sept. 
3, 2021). 
37 See Chris J. Katopis, Perfect Happiness?: Game Theory As A Tool For 
Enhancing Patent Quality, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 360, 365 (2008) (discussing 
additional information on USPTO filing trends and its history) (hereinafter 
Katopis, Perfect Happiness). 
38 Ron A. Bouchard, Qualifying Intellectual property II: A New Innovation 
Index for Pharmaceutical Patents & Products, 28 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER 
& HIGH TECH. L.J. 287, 311 (2011). 
39 Additionally, the USPTO has a division, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board 
(PTAB), that regularly reviews previously granted U.S. patents that are likely 




domestic and foreign patent applications and issuing patents. The 
patent business is booming. The USPTO’s records show that it 
continues to issue a record number of patents overall and at an 
accelerating pace.40 Importantly, and for the purposes of this article, 
the USPTO is issuing a record number of patents at an accelerating 
pace in the fintech sector, including blockchain and crypto 
technologies. Frighteningly, any one of these issued patents may prove 
to be an existential threat to one or more fintech companies. The rising 
patent tide has truly lifted all boats, but a tsunami may be on the 
horizon. 
Readers should consider the historical trends concerning patent 
activity. The U.S. patent system was established by Congress in 
1790.41 In 1911, merely some 120 years later, the one-millionth U.S. 
patent was issued to F.H. Houlton for the invention of a vehicle tire.42 
A generation ago, the former chief judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit, Howard T. Markey, observed that more than 
1,000,000 patents were issued in the some twenty years between 1953 
and 1971.43 Recently, in 2018, the ten millionth U.S. patent was 
granted.44 Today, the USPTO is on track to issue one million patents 
every three years (e.g., more than 300,000 patents annually).45 In sum, 
the long arc of history confirms that the rate of patent grants, or 
      
involved in a federal district court legal action. The PTAB will be discussed 
later in the Article. 
40 Table of Issue Years and Patent Numbers, for Selected Document Types 
Issued Since 1836, U.S. PAT. TRADEMARK OFF., 
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/issuyear.htm (last visited 
Sept. 3, 2021). 
41 Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1970). 
42 Technically, there were also additional patents previously issued in U.S. 
history. The Patent Office lost a large number of its files and patent records 
in an 1836 fire. Thereafter, the patent numbering system reset, and the Patent 
Office once again started numbering its patents starting anew from number 
one. 
43 Howard T. Markey, The Status of the Patent System—“Sans Myth, Sans 
Fiction”, 59 J.P.O.S. 164 (1977). 
44 See Patents Through History, U.S. PAT. TRADEMARK OFF., 
https://10millionpatents.uspto.gov (last visited July 16, 2021); see also 
Katopis, Perfect Happiness, supra note 37. 
45 FY 2020 Performance and Accountability Report, U.S. PAT. TRADEMARK 
OFF., 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USPTOFY20PAR.pdf 
(hereinafter Annual Reports). 
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issuance continues to accelerate over time, as illustrated by the 
following chart. 
 
Chart 3: Milestones in U.S. Patenting46 
47 
 
The table below summarizes this past decade’s patent activity, 
48 including the total number of U.S. patents, total patents, blockchain 
patents, bitcoin patents, and worldwide blockchain applications. While 
this is based on publicly available data sources, it should not be 
      
46 Milestones in U.S. patenting, U.S. PAT. TRADEMARK OFF., 
https://www.uspto.gov/patents/milestones (last visited Sept. 28, 2021) (This 
increased volume and pace is driven by an ever-increasing number of overseas 
patent applications from overseas.). 
47 Milestones in U.S. Patenting, U.S. PAT. TRADEMARK OFF., 
https://www.uspto.gov/patents/milestones (last visited Aug. 1, 2021). 
48 Table 1 is based on the following sources: (1) the numbers of the “Recent 
USPTO Patent Grants” patent applications are taken from its USPTO’s 
Annual Reports; (2) the number of “Granted U.S. Patents with Blockchain 
Claims” is derived a from a keyword search of granted patent claims from the 
USPTO online database using the terms “blockchain” and “bitcoin” 
respectively; (3) the number of “Estimated Worldwide Blockchain Patent 
Applications” is derived from the European Patent Office’s international 
database. See, e.g., Tim Pohlmann, Who are the patent leaders in blockchain?, 
IAM (June 12, 2019), https://www.iam-media.com/who-are-patent-leaders-
blockchain; see also Berndsen, supra note 34. The author notes that this 
methodology merely provides a first approximation. These fintech patents 
may relate to patented technologies from a variety of fields, e.g., cryptology, 
security, encryption, finance, without expressly using these terms. Many are 
from USPTO Technology Centers TC 2400 and TC 2800. A “technology 
center” is an organizational division of the PTO wherein its assigned 
employees all examine patent applications in a similar field of science and 
technology. Note to readers, the statistics for the year 2021 are only for 
January – June 2021, given the date of this article’s publication. 




considered complete. In the U.S. and most of the world, patent 
applications are held in secret and not publicly disclosed for 18 months 
of pendency.49 Thus, additional patents on a variety of fintech 
technologies may be pending for near-term agency consideration and 
final issuance. Nevertheless, the data show an exponential growth in 
blockchain patent activity. Most notably, it is that Chinese companies 
are increasing their contribution to the overall growth in global patent 
activity and are leading in the fintech category with a significant 


























      
49 Generally, in the U.S., the average utility patent application pendency 
before any final determination as to its grant as a patent may be between 18 
and 36 months.  
50 Andrea Wechsler, Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and Indian Patent 
Information in Comparison: Asia’s Rising Role in Technology Disclosure 
Through the Patent System, 2 TSINGHUA CHINA L. REV. 101, 104 (2009). 
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     Table 1: Recent USPTO Patent Grants51 


























2010 207,915 233,127 0 0 23 
2011 221,350 244,430 0 0 23 
2012 246,646 270,058 0 0 37 
2013 265,979 290,083 0 0 72 
2014 303,930 329,612 0 2 226 
2015 295,460 322,449 0 2 465 
2016 304,568 334,107 3 7 1478 
2017 315,367 347,642 17 16 3,768 
2018 306,912 339,512 82 24 8,249 
2019 336,846 370,423 319 27 2,354 
2020 360,784 399,055 943 24 N/A*52 
2021   819 26  
 
Several factors are driving this accelerated patent pace. Some 
may be characterized optimistically and others cynically. Patents are 
perceived as benefitting the inventors and the public in a variety of 
ways. Patent advocates argue that inventors continue to seek patents 
because they advance the goals of, inter alia, securing capital 
investment, creating a competitive advantage, and adding to the public 
storehouse of knowledge. Others argue that such patents are merely 
akin to trophies and serve no legitimate business purpose.53 Legal 
scholars argue that this enormous number of patents is simply 
irrational because more than 99.9% of patents will never be licensed 
or litigated.54 In Patent Portfolios, Professors Parchomovsky and 
Wagner conclude that these previously described trends represent a 
“patent paradox”:  
      
51 See, e.g., Tim Pohlmann, Who are the patent leaders in blockchain?, IAM 
(June 12, 2019), https://www.iam-media.com/who-are-patent-leaders-
blockchain; see also Berndsen, supra note 34. 
52 Since nearly all nations hold pending patent applications in secret for at least 18 months, the most 
recent data is not publicly available as of this article’s publication.  
53 Seth Fiegerman, In Tech, Patents are Trophies – and These Companies are 
Dominating, CNN (June 19 ,2018), 
https://money.cnn.com/2018/06/19/technology/tech-patents/index.html. 
54 See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1495 (2001). 










It is abundantly clear that firms act as though patents 
are important  
 . . . [f]iling patterns and firms’ attitudes toward patents 
have presented theorists with a puzzle: if patents are 
valuable, where does their value lie?55  
 
In 1973, two commentators made the following cynical 
observation about the patent system of a generation ago: 
 
Do the officials of the Patent Office really care about 
the validity of the patents which are issued from their 
agency, as long as the production goals which they set 
for the patent examiners concerning the disposal of 
patent applications are met? The official position of the 
Patent Office is that they desire the issuance of patents 
of the highest possible validity. But, in view of their 
actual conduct concerning production goals, this 
position must be viewed as at least open to question. As 
long as the officials of the Patent Office demand greater 
production of disposal each year . . . it is difficult indeed 
for anyone with an objective viewpoint to be convinced 
that they are paying anything more than lip service to 
the concept of the highest possible patent validity.56 
 
As noted, the USPTO is on pace to issue about one million 
patents every three years.57 This astonishing output is rooted in the 
continuous increase in applicants from domestic applicants, the soaring 
increase in foreign applications, and the overall easing of legal 
standards around patent eligibility. Further, one must assume that the 
business community is validating the principle that a patent confers an 
      
55 Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1, 5 (2005).  
56 Martin R. Horn & Saul Epstein, The Federal Courts’ View of Patents—A 
Different View, 55 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y. 134, 134 (1973). 
57 See Patents Through History, supra note 44. 
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economic benefit, either offensively against a party, to raise venture 
capital, or merely defensively to ward off litigation. 
Based on current trends, we can conclude that the volume and 
pace of fintech-related patents that relate to fintech, for example, 
blockchain and crypto technologies, will only continue, if not increase, 
over time. More is more. In recent years, the USPTO has granted a 
record number of patents across all sectors of technology.58 This 
growth in patent activity may be attributed to influencing factors, 
including the evolving legal standards governing patentability, the 
USPTO’s interpretation of these legal standards in its examination, and 
perhaps even the industry’s increased demand due to its own irrational 
behavior.59 
II. TREND TWO: THE U.S. PATENT OFFICE’S RECENT 
EXAMINATION GUIDANCE WAS A BOON TO FINTECH-
RELATED PATENTED INVENTIONS  
The legal standards surrounding the scope of patentable subject 
matter eligibility (SME) — namely, what precisely can be patented in 
this country—have evolved due to recent Supreme Court 
interpretations of the statutory framework. The Patent Act (35 U.S.C. 
§ 101 et seq.) provides the fundamental framework for U.S. patent law, 
including the parameters of patent-eligible subject matter. Section 101 
of the Patent Act provides the fundamental, independent categories of 
patent-eligible subject matter (SME).60 Legal scholars note that these 
categories and the provision’s text can be traced back to the founding 
of the republic and the first Patent Act of 1790.61 Section 101 of Patent 
Act simply states: 
      
58 Table of Issue Years and Patent Numbers, for Selected Document Types 
Issued Since 1836, U.S. PAT. TRADEMARK OFF., 
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/issuyear.htm (last visited 
Sept. 3, 2021). 
59 See e.g., Andrew Toole & Nicholas A. Pairolero, et al. Adjusting to Alice 
USPTO patent examination outcomes after Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank 
International, USPTO Office of the Chief Economist, IP Data Highlights No. 
3 (Apr. 2020), available at 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/OCE-
DH_AdjustingtoAlice.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2021). 
60 The USPTO maintains a web page summarizing its policy and interpretation 
of § 101. See Subject matter eligibility, U.S. PAT. TRADEMARK OFF., 
https://www.uspto.gov/patents/laws/examination-policy/subject-matter-
eligibility?MURL=PatentEligibility (last visited July 16, 2021). Readers 
should be advised that subject matter eligibility is only but one of the factors 
under the statute. The Patent Act also provides other requirements for a patent, 
including novelty (§ 102), non-obviousness (§ 103), and more. For this 
Article’s discussion and purposes, these criteria are less important for the 
principal analysis. 
61 Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1970).  





Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, 
may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions 
and requirements of this title.62 
 
Legal observers explain that the operative, overarching theory 
behind patentable subject matter is that Congress intended the section 
to be interpreted broadly, tempered by the other statutory requirements 
of the Act.63 Advocates often invoke Congress’s guidance, which 
alleges that one can patent “anything under the sun that is made by 
man.”64  
In practice, the legacy of these four statutory categories is 
anything but simple. Every generation seems to grapple with the nature 
and types of inventions properly constituting patent-eligible subject 
matter, whether the proposed eligible subject matter was software,65 
surgical methods,66 or genetically modified organisms,67 to name just 
a few. In this article’s context, the legal issues center on whether the 
statute’s grant of patent subject matter eligibility to a “process” 
provides the basis for the protection of various methods for finance, 
economic activity, and commerce relying on technology. Here the past 
is prologue, and the current legal debate on this question is as 
complicated as ever. 
The legal jurisprudence pertaining to patent-eligible subject 
matter (Section 101) fills tomes. The legal analysis goes well beyond 
the plain meaning of the words of the statute. A heavy judicial gloss 
      
62 Act of Jul. 19, 1952, 66 Stat. 797. 
63 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
64 The Committee Reports accompanying the 1952 Patent Act. S. Rep. No 
1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952); H.R. Rep. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 
6 (1952); S. Rep. 1979, at 5; H. R. Rep. 1923, at 6 (“A person may have 
‘invented’ a machine or a manufacture, which may include anything under the 
sun that is made by man, but it is not necessarily patentable under section 101 
unless the conditions of [this] title are fulfilled.”). 
65 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (upholding the patentability of certain 
processes through articulating a new judicial analysis framework). 
66 See Chris J. Katopis, Patents v. Patients?: Recent Policy Implications of 
Recent Patent Legislation, 71 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 329 (1997) (discussing, 
Pallin v. Singer, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1050 (1995)). 
67 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (upholding the patentability 
of genetically modified organisms). 
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has animated the meaning of this section. For the fintech world, three 
recent U.S. federal court opinions have had a significant impact on the 
jurisprudence surrounding Section 101.68 
In Section 101 jurisprudence, the federal courts have 
acknowledged, if not wholly judicially created, a number of judicial 
exceptions to patentable subject matter, such as a prohibition on the 
patenting of laws of nature (e.g., E=mc2).69 In the landmark 1980’s 
opinion Diamond v. Diehr, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed three 
categories of subject matter that are unpatentable, namely “laws of 
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.”70 In upholding the 
patentability of a process incorporating a mathematical formula, the 
Court wrote: 
 
[A] new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant 
found in the wild is not patentable subject matter. 
Likewise, Einstein could not patent his celebrated law 
that E = mc2; nor could Newton have patented the law 
of gravity. Such discoveries are “manifestations of . . . 
nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to 
none.”71 
 
In making this distinction between the protection of pure and 
applied scientific and mathematical principles, the Supreme Court 
ruling validated a fundamental concept still quite applicable to fintech 
today. Namely, many fintech and intangible process/method 
inventions are implicated as they inevitably incorporate a 
mathematical formula as a fundamental element of their invention. A 
recurring theme for the Supreme Court’s patent jurisprudence is 
defending the public “storehouse of knowledge” and avoiding the 
private preemption of that knowledge.72 For the Supreme Court, it is 
      
68 In the current discussion of the Supreme Court §101 process/method 
jurisprudence, a third case is also frequently mentioned. This third case 
concerns issues in the life sciences sector. Hence, for the purposes of this 
Article, it is not relevant for the fintech sector issues. Mayo Collaborative 
Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012) (holding that the 
process to determine the dosage of naturally occurring drug metabolites is 
ineligible patentable subject matter pursuant to § 101). 
69 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012). 
70 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (upholding the patentability 
of a process that as a whole incorporates a mathematical formula). 
71 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. 
Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)). 
72 While the judicially crafted exceptions are beyond the plain text of the 
statute, the Court has observed that they are “part of the storehouse of 
knowledge of all men . . . free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.” 
Funk Bros. Seed Co., 333 U.S. at 130. 




not permissible to confer a patent monopoly based merely on an 
algorithm or a fundamental form of human economic business activity. 
Notably, the fundamental technology underlying many fintech ledger 
technologies is math and data (e.g., the encryption’s computation of 
hash of a certain bit length). Opponents argue that more is necessary 
before invoking patent protection. The federal courts have struggled to 
draw an appropriate line. While some legal questions around 
patentability have been settled for decades, many of the Supreme 
Court’s latest Section 101 opinions have proven surprising and 
disruptive to the regular order. 
Many legal observers and industry insiders believed for 
decades that the courts had relied upon a judicially crafted73 business 
method exemption to patent subject matter eligibility. In 1999, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit expressly rejected that 
principle. In State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial 
Group, Inc., the court held that patents directed at methods of doing 
business were indeed patent-eligible subject matter.74 The Federal 
Circuit’s reasoning was based on a broad interpretation of the Patent 
Act’s Section 101 and its application of the judicially crafted test 
considering a claimed process’s “useful, concrete, and tangible 
result.”75 State Street’s controversial opinion instantly became 
notorious and launched a public hue and cry that raged for nearly two 
decades. 
Q. Todd Dickinson, the Assistant Secretary of Commerce and 
the head of the USPTO during the Clinton administration, was 
responsible for the agency’s patent examination policy during the 
intense debate over the State Street opinion. He was an ardent 
supporter of patents on methods and processes covering a broad 
spectrum of eligibility, including business and commercial activity. 
Dickinson had testified before congressional hearings and written 
extensively in the defense of business-related patents, including the 
following remarks:  
 
      
73 In this context, “judicially crafted” means a statutory construction, 
analytical framework, or judge made law outside the plain text of the Patent 
Act. 
74 State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (The court upheld the patentability of U.S. Patent No. 
5,193,056, entitled “Data Processing System for Hub and Spoke Financial 
Services Configuration.”). 
75 Id. 
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The private sector looks for financial returns on its 
research investment, whereas [the U.S. Government] 
does not. Of course, the financial returns are very often 
packaged as, or linked to, intellectual property rights. 
Thus the increasing role of private funding in R&D has 
meant an increasing role for the intellectual property 
system. . . . As companies have come to realize that 
increasing value rests on knowledge, they have, 
naturally enough, pushed to convert that value into 
assets. One way–perhaps the principal way–that 
conversion occurs is through intellectual property 
rights. . . . In 1999, in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Signature Financial Group, Inc., the federal courts 
validated the PTO analysis in those guidelines. The 
court also rejected the so-called “business method 
exception,” stating that inventions of this nature may be 
invalid on other grounds, such as lack of novelty or 
obviousness, but not because they were improper 
subject matter.76  
 
In the ensuing years, the agency’s examination policy resulted 
in the grant of thousands of business method patents.77 Hence, many 
of these business method patents were asserted against parties and 
litigated in the federal courts; while others were used as a basis to 
establish and finance fintech companies. 
The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately considered a variety of 
these subject matter eligibility issues in a trio of cases. In 2010, in 
Bilski v. Kappos, the Supreme Court considered the patentability of a 
rejected application for a method of hedging economic risk.78 
However, the Court spoke to a much greater question about the scope 
of patentability. The Court upheld the lower court’s invalidation of the 
      
76 The Hon. Q. Todd Dickinson, Reconciling Research and the Patent System, 
16 ISSUES IN SCI. AND TECH. 4 (Summer 2000), available at 
https://issues.org/dickinson/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2021). 
77 Ann M. Rizzo, The Aftermath of State Street Bank & Trust v. Signature 
Financial 
Group: Effects of United States Electronic Commerce Business Method 
Patentability on International Legal and Economic Systems, 50 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 313 (2000) (“the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) has 
witnessed a 70 percent increase in business method patents since the Federal 
Circuit decided State Street Bank v. Signature Financial Group (State Street 
II) in early 1999”). 
78 The patent-application-in-suit was rejected at multiple stages of the process. 
U.S. Patent Application No. 08/833,892. The process patent application was 
“for a claimed invention that explains how buyers and sellers of commodities 
in the energy market can protect, or hedge, against the risk of price changes.”  




business method patent-application-in-suit.79 In retrospect, some may 
regard this litigated method as a very trivial type of a patented process. 
More significantly, in Bilski, the Court’s 9-0 opinion expressly rejected 
the long-standing “machine-or-transformation test” as the judiciary’s 
sole test of a process’s patentability under Section 101.80 Significantly, 
the Court also preserved business method patents as a viable category 
of patent-eligible subject matter.81 Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion 
preserved the category of business method patents at large based on its 
statutory construction of the Patent Act.82 The Court observed, inter 
alia, that “Congress took this permissive approach to patent eligibility 
to ensure that ‘ingenuity should receive a liberal encouragement.’”83  
In the 2014 case Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, the 
U.S. Supreme Court further considered the scope of patent-eligible 
inventions.84 Here, the Court essentially narrowed the scope of the 
patentability of process/method patents, though they were still 
preserved as a class.85 The Supreme Court rejected the lower court’s 
SME analytical framework, rather opting for a two-part patentability 
analysis.86 The Alice two-prong analysis for a claimed patented process 
first considers whether the claim contains an “abstract idea”; and 
second, whether the said claim has any sufficient additional elements 
providing an “inventive concept” thus transforming it into the requisite 
patentable eligible subject matter.87  
Alice’s jurisprudence and its new, more restrictive patent 
eligibility standards were a welcome relief for many in the financial 
services and software industries.88 In contrast, Alice was poorly 
received in some quarters, with some legal practitioners arguing that 
      
79 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 613 (2010).  
80 Id at 604.  
81 Id. at 607–08. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 601 (quoting 5 Writings of Thomas Jefferson 75–76 (H. Washington 
ed. 1871)). 
84 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014). 
85 Id. at 226. 
86 Id. at 217. 
87 Id. at 218–21, (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus 
Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71 (2012)). 
88 See generally Michael Rosen, Patent owners breathing slightly easier as 
‘Alice’ noose loosens further, AEIDEAS BLOG, 
https://www.aei.org/technology-and-innovation/intellectual-property/patent-
owners-breathing-slightly-easier-as-alice-noose-loosens-further/ (last visited 
Sept. 25, 2021). 
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the resulting two-prong test was confusing and unpredictable.89 
Nevertheless, as a result, the business of business method patents saw 
a sea change. In practice, it became extraordinarily difficult to obtain 
patent protection on such claimed method and process type inventions, 
and the USPTO’s allowance rate percentage for such inventions 
declined into the single digits.  
In response to the Bilski-Alice-Mayo Supreme Court opinions 
about subject-matter eligibility, the USPTO in 2019 issued new patent 
examination guidance (“PEG”) to its corps of 8,000-plus patent 
examiners.90 The new agency PEG guidance arguably tracked the Alice 
analytical framework and mandated its patent examiners to apply 
Alice’s two-part analysis (i.e., prong one considered whether the 
application claim presented an abstract idea, while prong two 
considered whether the application recited redeeming “inventive 
concept” elements).91 The resulting changes in examination policy 
were striking because they substantially increased allowance rates for 
such types of intangible inventions. Certainly, the run-of-the-mill 
business method patents92 (i.e., a method for “buying low, selling high” 
or paying a bill with cryptocurrency without technologically more) 
were still dubious and through additional scrutiny still screened out as 
invalid. Upon review of the evidence and results, one can conclude that 
the PEG guidance resulted in increasing the coarseness of the agency’s 
examination filter and yielding a corresponding increase in 
patentability across many fields, including fintech. 
In 2020, the USPTO’s Office of the Chief Economist assessed 
the impact of the agency’s recently revised patent examination 
guidance (“PEG”).93 It issued a report that confirmed what many in the 
tech industry had suspected, if not simply outright feared. The USPTO 
      
89 Ping-Hsun Chen, Patent-Eligibility Standard for Network Architecture 
Patents Under the Federal Circuit’s Jurisprudence, 36 SANTA CLARA HIGH 
TECH. L.J. 1, 6 (2019) 
(“The Alice standard has been criticized by some commentators because of 
its confusion and vagueness. For example, one commentator observes that the 
Federal Circuit has struggled in defining the scope of abstract ideas and 
questions if the Federal Circuit has turned step two analysis into a novelty test 
by focusing on whether claim elements are conventional.”). 
90 See Adjusting to Alice USPTO patent examination outcomes after Alice 
Corp. v. 
CLS Bank International report of the USPTO, U.S. PAT. TRADEMARK OFF. 
(Apr. 2020), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/OCE-
DH_AdjustingtoAlice.pdf (“This report focuses on two USPTO patent 
examination outcomes and evaluates how these outcomes changed in 
response to the Alice decision.”) (hereinafter Adjusting to Alice). 
91 See generally Alice Corp., supra note 84. 
92 Business methods are reviewed by section 705 of the USPTO examination 
corps. 
93 See Adjusting to Alice, supra note 90. 




was able to dramatically increase the allowance rate of intangible 
inventions through its new examination policies, which debatably 
correctly tracked the recent Supreme Court patent SME 
jurisprudence.94  
In its findings, the USPTO argued that “[t]he evidence suggests 
that the 2019 PEG provided clarity and structure to the decision-
making process.”95 The report further illustrated the effect of the new 
examination guidance in reducing the probability of a given patent 
receiving a Section 101 rejection.96  
 
Chart 4: USPTO Adjusting to Alice Report97 
 
 
In practice, reducing the probability of any given basis for 
rejection suggests an increase in the allowance of an application. This 
result is consistent with the overall data reported by the article above. 
For fintech, the implications of the agency PEG guidance and 
      
94 See generally Britain Eakin, Iancu Touts Patent Eligibility Guidance That 
Just ‘Works’, LAW360 (Sept. 25, 2021) 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1202980 (last visited Sept. 25, 2021). 
95 Adjusting to Alice, supra note 90, at 7. 
96 Note that while the probability of a Section 101 rejection decreased, a given 
patent could still be finally rejected for another defect (e.g., lacking novelty 
(Section 102), non-obviousness (Section 103), etc.). 
97 Adjusting to Alice, supra note 56, at 5. 
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procedures must be studied more closely. Given the 2019 PEG 
guidance, the allowance rate for the run-of-the-mill, pure business 
method patent category (Class 705) is still quite low. Notably, in 
contrast, the allowance rate for patents on more complicated elements 
in fintech and crypto, such as on the security aspects of a system or the 
database ledger, are alleged to have tripled, rising from 10% to 30% 
across various technology centers, including 2400 (ledger aspects) and 
2800 (databases).98 Looking ahead, it is unclear whether this 
examination guidance will remain in effect in the future. 
Congressional leaders heeded the hue-and-cry from 
stakeholders and the public about the alleged uncertainty and 
confusion surrounding the state of patent-eligible subject matter 
(Section 101). During the 116th session of Congress (2019–2020), the 
U.S. Senate Judiciary Intellectual Property Subcommittee held three 
days of hearings that featured more than 45 witnesses.99 Lawmakers 
circulated and discussed proposed draft patent SME Section 101, 
which was legislation intended to clarify, if not to ease, eligibility. 
Ultimately, these efforts yielded no legislative action. Today, legal 
observers are pessimistic that Congress will enact any reforms 
concerning the eligibility question anytime in the near future.100 
Accordingly, the federal courts will continue to be the main source of 
interpretation and guidance concerning these patentability issues. 
In sum, the shifting legal standards around the once bedrock 
principle of patent subject matter eligibility (Section 101) has had a 
material impact on fintech patents and arguably industry innovation. 
This history emphasizes the government’s powerful role in securing 
patent rights on fintech innovation, and hence, likely securing the 
corresponding underlying investment in this field. The shifting 
standards have modulated both patent applications and allowances in 
the field, not unlike the turning of a radio with a dial. In the face of the 
perceived threat of this increased patent activity, the finance and 
      
98 Phone interviews with UPSTO examiners on file with the author. 
99 See Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Intellectual Property 116th 
Congressional Report, IPWATCHDOG, (last visited July 16, 2021); see also 
Eileen McDermott, Final Panelists at Senate 101 Hearings Stress Real-World 
Effects of Status Quo, Tillis Signals Changes to Draft Text, IPWATCHDOG 
(June 11, 2019), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/06/11/final-panelists-
senate-101-hearing-stress-real-world-effects-status-quo-tillis-signals-
changes-draft-text/id=110297/. 
100 Eileen McDermott, USPTO Delivers on Senators’ Request for Patent 
Eligibility Jurisprudence Study, IPWATCHDOG (July 8, 2021), 
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2021/07/08/uspto-delivers-senators-request-
patent-eligibility-jurisprudence-study/id=135339/ (“[O]ne of the authors of 
the March letter, Senator Thom Tillis (R-NC), led the charge in 2019 trying 
to reach agreement on reforms to Section 101/ patent eligibility law, 
ultimately declaring it ‘dead on arrival’ without stakeholder consensus.”). 




technology industries have advocated lawmakers and regulators 
pursue a variety of remedial safeguards. 
III. TREND THREE: THE FEDERAL COURTS STRENGTHENED 
SAFEGUARDS AGAINST POOR PATENT QUALITY 
In response to almost a decade of intensive industry lobbying, 
the U.S. Congress enacted a sweeping reform of the patent law—the 
most significant change since the 1952 Patent Act.101 In 2011, 
Congress enacted the America Invents Act (AIA) which added a 
number of sweeping statutory reforms to the patent system.102 One 
significant reform established a number of procedures within the 
USPTO for reconsidering poor-quality or weak patents that were 
previously issued and potentially subject to some type of federal court 
litigation challenge.103 The goal was to establish an administrative 
alternative to costly, lengthy, and burdensome court litigation.104 The 
AIA established the following procedures within the USPTO’s Patent 
Trial and Appeal Board, each having different criteria for 
reconsidering the validity of an issued patent: (1) inter partes review 
(“IPR”), (2) post-grant review opposition (“PGR”), and (3) the 
Transitional Program for Covered Business Methods (CBM).105 
These three PTAB mechanisms continue to prove significant 
in many ways. The procedures have proven even more popular and 
effective than predicted, such that their use has far exceeded the 
anticipated demand. Since the AIA’s enactment, more than 14,000 
such administrative cases have been brought to review patent 
validity.106 It has been widely reported that approximately 85% of 
patents were invalidated through these cases.107 These procedures have 
also proven very unpopular with certain stakeholders, especially patent 
      
101 Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. 
§§ 1 et seq. (1952)). 
102 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat (2011). 
103 See America Invents Act, H. Report No. REPT. 112–98 (June 1, 2012) 
https://www.congress.gov/112/crpt/hrpt98/CRPT-112hrpt98.pdf (last visited 
Sept. 25, 2021). 
104 Id. at 48 (The AIA legislative report explains that new post-grant review 
proceedings to review patents with “the purpose of the section as providing 
quick and cost effective alternatives to litigation.”).  
105 Patent Act of 1952, supra note 103, at § 18 (Note that the AIA also contains 
several other reforms, such as provisions directed at a category of patents for 
tax avoidance strategies.). 
106 See Statistics, U.S. PAT. TRADEMARK OFF., (Feb. 14, 2021, 8:27 AM), 
https://www.uspto.gov/patents/ptab/statistics. 
107 Id. 
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owners seeing who have seen their patents struck down. Accordingly, 
a number of legal suits have been brought, challenging the AIA’s 
procedures and legal regime. Many of these anti-AIA legal challenges 
have failed.108 The federal courts have provided guidance that, in many 
ways, has further strengthened the proceedings and its ability to 
invalidate challenged patent claims.  
Two arguably conflicting trends are emerging. First, the 
USPTO, the gatekeeper agency, is more generous toward those seeking 
patents. It continues to reevaluate and ease its patentability standards 
and accelerate the pace of patenting activity. Second, the USPTO’s 
mechanisms for invalidating poor-quality patent claims across all 
technology fields have been strengthened through recent federal court 
rulings. Accordingly, it appears that the government giveth with one 
hand and taketh away with the other. Observers conclude that despite 
the continued existence of patents on esoteric, intangible inventions 
(e.g., underlying blockchain ledger elements), the patent system is 
evolving toward a different cohort of patents with higher-quality 
claims.109  
The following are two recent federal cases of note because they 
strengthen the existing agency procedures and mechanisms to 
invalidate patents: 
 
Thryv, Inc. v. Click-To-Call Technologies, LP: In 2020, 
the U.S. Supreme Court held that key Patent Act AIA 
trial procedures (35 U.S.C. § 314(d)) were precluded 
from judicial review.110 It foreclosed judicial review of 
the USPTO PTAB institution decision pursuant to the 
agency’s determination of the statutory one-year time 
bar. While petitioners challenging a patent by filing an 
inter partes review (IPR) petition must do so within the 
statutory time frame, the resulting USPTO’s institution 
decision cannot be subsequently challenged in federal 
court. In turn, this administrative mechanism provides 
those petitioning the USPTO seeking to invalidate 
patents additional safeguards toward the institution 
process. In construing these Patent Act AIA provisions, 
the Court explained that this furthers the goal of the 
      
108 See, e.g., Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 
138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018) (upholding the constitutionality of the AIA PTAB 
post-grant validity review procedures). 
109 See, e.g., Sasha Moss et al., Inter Partes Review As A Means To Improve 
Patent Quality, 46 R STREET SHORTS 1 (Sept. 2017), 
https://www.rstreet.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/09/RSTREETSHORT46.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 
2021). 
110 Thryv, Inc. v. Click-To-Call Technologies, LP, 140 S. Ct. 1367 (2020). 




statute, which is “to weed out bad patent claims 
efficiently,” not “to save bad patent claims” through 
procedural technicalities.111  
 
Security People, Inc. v. Iancu: In 2020, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that a 
constitutional challenge to an IPR final written decision 
is subject to judicial review only by appeal to the 
Federal Circuit, not by collateral attack in district court 
under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA).112 
 
These two court opinions strengthened the Patent Act’s AIA 
trials as an important tool to check patent quality and invalidate poor-
quality patents across all sectors, including fintech and blockchain. In 
contrast, some critics argue that while these court rulings may serve as 
a generalized improvement for the innovation ecosystem against the 
most egregious patents, the fintech industry may still be plagued by a 
wide variety of poor-quality patents and specious patent litigation.113 
Other critics argue that such procedures chill innovation as the patent 
system seems absurd and futile in the end.114 It is likely that we will 
see a robust public policy debate over additional congressional reforms 
to the Patent Act (such as the reinstatement of the now-expired CBM 
program), the USPTO’s internal rulemaking pertaining to examination 
guidelines, and its PTAB procedures. Any such reforms may be years 
in the making. In the alternative, it is telling that the fintech industry is 
also looking to a variety of private sector, industry-based legal 
defensive mechanisms. 
      
111 Id. at 1374. 
112 Security People, Inc. v. Iancu, 971 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2020).  
113 See Eileen McDermott, Special Interest Group Implores Congress to 
Extend CBM Program, IPWATCHDOG (Sept. 3, 2020), 
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2020/09/03/special-interest-group-implores-
congress-extend-cbm-program/id=124863/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2021). 
114 See letter of IEEE-USA to Sens. Tillis and Coons, IEEE-USA (July 14, 
2020), https://ieeeusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/071420.pdf 
(“Protections for technologies from artificial intelligence to DRM to 
blockchain or to cybersecurity— which are implemented through software—
are put at greater risk because of the CBM Program.”). 
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IV. TREND FOUR: PRIVATE SECTOR CONTINUED TO ORGANIZE TO 
FORM LITIGATION DEFENSIVE MECHANISMS  
In response to the continuing threat of costly patent litigation, 
the fintech industry has organized several private sector organizations 
to ward off specious patent legal challenges. Patent litigation is 
notoriously expensive to defend.115 Legal costs often climb into the 
high six figures, if not into the millions.116 Observer’s label patent 
litigation as a “bet the company” event and that it poses an existential 
threat.117  
 
A variety of novel organizations have emerged to help the 
fintech industry: 
 
The LOT Network: The License on Transfer (“LOT”) Network 
is a nonprofit organization formed in 2014 to defend high-tech 
companies across a number of technology sectors from patent 
litigation threats.118 The LOT Network website boasts that they 
“prevent unwanted litigation while preserving the use of your 
patents. Join the community of 1600+ global industry leaders 
who have collaboratively immunized themselves against 
lawsuits from Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs, also known as 
‘patent trolls’).”119 Its founding members include a several tech 
companies.120 Its 1,100-plus membership includes a number of 
      
115 See generally Intellectual Property: Assessing Factors That Affect Patent 
Infringement Litigation Could Help Improve Patent Quality, GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF. (Aug. 2013), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-13-
465.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2021). 
116 Id. at 25 n.47 (“For the 18 percent of those lawyers that responded, AIPLA 
reports that the median legal cost for one patent infringement lawsuit was 
$650,000 when less than $1 million was at risk for damages; $2.5 million 
when between $1 million and $25 million was at risk for damages; and $5 
million when more than $25 million was at risk for damages. These costs 
include legal fees and exclude damage awards.”). 
117 See, e.g., Improving Federal Court Adjudication of Patent Cases Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, The Internet, and Intellectual Prop., 109 
Cong. 59 (2005) (statement of Chris J. Katopis); Yury Kapgan & Kathy Yu, 
Betting the company: the bottom line in patent litigation, DAILY J. (Jan. 3, 
2012) https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/keys-to-patent-litigation-
strategy (“For many businesses, patent lawsuits can be ‘bet the company’ type 
of litigation.”).  
118 Ken Seddon, Invest in Growth How LOT Network Addresses the PAE 
Problem, LOTNETWORK (Nov. 2, 2016) https://lotnet.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/12/Introduction-of-LOT-2.0.1.pdf (last visited Sept. 
25, 2021). 
119 See LOTNETWORK, https://lotnet.com/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2021). 
120 See LOT Network Achieves Significant Membership Milestone – 1,000 
Members and Counting, LOTNETWORK (Oct. 28, 2020), 




leading innovative companies that secure fintech patents, 
including IBM, Square, and Visa.121 
 
Unified Patents: Unified Patents is a private company 
that helps member companies defend against patent 
litigation by offering a suite of services based on either 
a free or paid membership.122 In turn, it offers a range 
of services, such as analytical data, legal services, and 
lobbying.123 
 
COPA: In 2020, under Jack Dorsey’s leadership, 
Square, Inc. organized, the Crypto Open Patent 
Alliance (“COPA”).124 The goal is for the member 
fintech companies to place their crypto patents in a 
shared library to help ward off aggressive patent 
assertions in court by so-called non-practicing entities 
(NPEs) or patent trolls.125 
 
The emergence of such industry defensive organizations is 
quite telling. While companies invest millions into fintech innovation 
research and development and in the pursuit of patent protection, they 
are also seriously concerned about potential patent infringement 
liability and are making a concerted effort to ward off such problematic 
litigation. While industry players may keenly desire various aspects of 
patent reform, these organizations are an acknowledgment that any 
type of regulatory relief and litigation reform may be difficult to 
achieve and remains politically challenging and a long way off. 
      
https://lotnet.com/lot-network-achieves-significant-membership-milestone-
1000-members-and-counting/. 
121 Why Join Lot?, LOTNETWORK, https://lotnet.com/why-join-lot/ (last 
visited Jan. 31, 2021). 
122 JOIN, UNIFIED PAT., https://www.unifiedpatents.com/join (last visited 
Sept. 25, 2021). 
123 Id. 
124 Adrian Zmudzinski, Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey launches Crypto Open 
Patent Alliance, MODERNCONSENUS (Sept. 11, 2021), 
https://modernconsensus.com/cryptocurrencies/twitter-ceo-jack-dorsey-
launches-crypto-open-patent-alliance/. 
125 See, e.g., Paddy Baker, Square Forms Group to Stop Patent Hoarding from 
Stifling Crypto Innovation, COINDESK (Sept. 10, 2020, 9:43 AM), 
https://www.coindesk.com/square-alliance-patents-crypto. 
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V. TREND FIVE: THE EMPIRICAL DATA SUGGESTS THAT 
UNCERTAINTY IN THE VALUE OF FINTECH PATENTS 
It is notoriously difficult to value an intellectual property asset, 
especially for cutting-edge patented technologies, (e.g., since they may 
not have secured an established market).126 A variety of methodologies 
may be employed based on a wide range of factors (e.g., an economic 
analysis utilizing an expected return on investment, the aggregate 
value of the future licensing royalty stream, etc.). Patents reflect a 
proxy on innovation and are, often a result of millions of R&D 
spending and capital investment. An old adage among patent attorneys 
is that a patent is only worth as much as the resulting monetary 
damages arising from a patent infringement lawsuit. In essence, patent 
litigation is a proxy for economic value. The establishment of the 
USPTO PTAB AIA post-grant validity trials was a direct response to 
costly and burdensome patent litigation.127 In an attempt to valuate 
fintech patents, the author has reviewed recent USPTO CBM records 
to assess the frequency of blockchain or crypto patents involved in 
such post-grant disputes. 
This article relies on the hypothesis that one can correlate the 
economic value of a given innovation, such as those protected by 
fintech patents covering blockchain and bitcoin, with the amount of 
patent activity. Many legal observers and economists argue that patents 
represent investment (e.g., human capital and R&D) secured by the 
patent right.128 Notably, many will further correlate a patent’s 
economic value with its post-grant patent activity, (e.g., disputes and 
litigation).129 The hypothesis supposes that rational behavior dictates 
      
126 See generally Kevin Rivette et al., Discovering New Value in Intellectual 
Property, H. BUS. REV. (Jan.-Feb. 2000), 
https://hbr.org/2000/01/discovering-new-value-in-intellectual-property (last 
visited Sept. 25, 2021). 
127 See 35 U.S.C. § 1 (2018); Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 
112–29; 125 Stat. 284 (2011) H.R. REP. NO. 112–98 (2011). 
128 See, e.g., Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 55, at 18 (2005) (“Given 
that virtually all the corporations that engage in intensive patenting operate in 
highly competitive industries, and that many of them are Fortune 500 
companies, it is highly unlikely that such irrational behavior could persist for 
so many years without grave economic consequences . . . this is not borne out 
by reality . . . “in discussing patents as internal metrics of an entity’s 
performance, innovation, R&D, or individual employee’s productivity.”); see 
also Frederic M. Scherer, INNOVATION AND GROWTH: SCHUMPETERIAN 
PERSPECTIVES 3–7 (1984) (describing phases of investment in development 
of inventions). 
129 See Alan C. Marco, The Option Value of Patent Litigation: Theory and 
Evidence, 2 (Vassar Coll. Econ., Working Paper # 52, 2003), 
https://www.vassar.edu/economics/docs/working-papers/VCEWP52.pdf 
(last visiting Aug. 1, 2021); John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemly, Kimberly A. 




that when a patent has economic value, it is often the subject of some 
type of commerce and inevitably legal activity (e.g., infringement 
litigation) concerning the disputed infringing commercial activity. 
Parties use the USPTO’s PTAB forum, in turn, to litigate issues 
pertaining to a patent controversy. Arguably, Congress established the 
CBM forum with the express purpose of reducing the frequency and 
cost of litigation in the financial services industry and patent litigation, 
including business method patent (BMP) litigation.130 This universe 
theoretically includes fintech technologies, including those that have a 
blockchain or crypto component. Further, one may also consider the 
creation of the industry sector defensive organizations described above 
(i.e., the LOT Network and COPA) as evidence that the fintech 
industry still considers patent litigation as inevitable, expensive, 
vexing, troublesome, and often specious. 
A search of the USPTO PTAB records yielded some surprising 
results.131 First, no “blockchain” patents have been the subject of AIA 
adversarial disputes to date, including the CBM program.132 Second, 
the CBM program was used quite modestly compared with other 
      
Moore et. al., ARTICLE: Valuable Patents, 92 GEO L.J. 435, 437 (2004) (“We 
conclude that the easiest way to discover the characteristics of valuable 
patents is to study litigated patents.”). Id. at 437; see also John R. Allison & 
Thomas W. Sager, Valuable Patents Redux: On the Enduring Merit of Using 
Patent Characteristics to Identify Valuable Patents, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1769 
(2007) (a key factor in the patent value (or worth) analysis for Allison et al. is 
estimating the probability that a patent is litigated.). 
130 The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) reviewed the USPTO 
CBM program and concluded the following: “Stakeholders we interviewed 
generally agreed that the CBM program has reduced litigation, and many said 
there is value in maintaining some aspects of the program. Stakeholders 
generally agreed that the CBM program has contributed to a decrease in 
litigation involving business methods patents and that the program has had 
positive effects on innovation and investment.” U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office: Assessment of the Covered Business Method Patent Review Program, 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF. 34 (Mar. 12, 2018), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-18-320.pdf . 
131 The USPTO PTAB maintains a publicly accessible case decision database. 
See Board Decisions, U.S. PAT. TRADEMARK OFF., 
https://developer.uspto.gov/ptab-web/#/search/decisions (last visited July 14, 
2021). 
132 Querying Results from Keyword Text Search of “Blockchain” and 
“Bitcoin” within the Decision Search Bar, USPTO PATENT TRIAL AND 
APPEAL BOARD DECISION DATABASE, https://developer.uspto.gov/ptab-
web/#/search/decisions. 
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PTAB trials (i.e., only about 500 actions during the program’s seven-
year existence) and compared with 14,000-plus AIA trials. Again, 
there were no blockchain-related patents in these disputes. More 
surprisingly, virtually no blockchain or cryptocurrency patents were 
subject to this post-grant federal agency review.133 To date, one can 
conclude that these species of fintech patents have neither developed 
significant economic market value in themselves nor have they been 
the subject of significant federal litigation disputes.134  
There are numerous alternative possibilities that explain why 
fintech patents covering blockchain and crypto-related technologies do 
not arise in these proceedings. There may be possible reasons 
including: (1) other patent quality safeguards have weeded out poor-
quality or otherwise weak patent claims before grant or before they 
posed a threat;135 (2) the current PTAB procedures only provided 
limited bases for disputing poor-quality patents; (3) the existence of 
procedural defects in the PTAB rules and procedures prohibit a 
defendant’s participation; (4) effective marketplace licensing regimes 
are in place; (5) private sector litigation defensive organizations are 
effective; (6) fintech platforms—especially in the cryptocurrency 
space—are open source; and (7) some patents are simply litigated later 
in their lifetime (again, many of these patents were only granted in the 
past five years). Further, any such patent cases may have merely been 
settled by the parties outside the dispute forums. The settlement terms 
may have included economic damages and/or the cross-licensing of 
technologies among parties. 
For interested readers, this article includes an appendix 
summarizing the recent CBM cases during 2020, including the case 
number, the disputed patent, and the party litigant information. The 
CBM review process has expired pursuant to the AIA’s statutory 
sunset provision.136 Legislators were correct in developing a 
transitional pilot program to address the legitimate patent quality and 
      
133 Id.  
134 Additionally, a search of the USPTO PTAB database of ex parte appeal 
reviews of such patent applications find the agency has merely considered 17 
blockchain applications, with the outcome that some examiner rejection was 
affirmed, as of this Article’s publication. See Board Decisions, supra note 
136. 
135 Board Decisions, supra note 136 (regarding the ex parte review). 
136 It is notable that legal observers concluded that upon a statistical analysis 
of the CBM program that “the success rate of petitioners steadily declined to 
the point that none prevailed in CBMR petitions filed after July 2018 for 
which the PTAB rendered a decision.” Ron D. Katznelson, The CBM program 
should expire this week as provided by law — Effective alternatives for robust 
administrative reviews of issued patents remain, US INVENTOR 6 (Sept. 13, 
2020) https://usinventor.org/wp-content/uploads/Katznelson-on-CBM-
sunset.pdf. 




litigation risk concerns of the financial services industry. Policymakers 
and regulators should certainly continue to monitor fintech patent 
litigation in the federal courts and PTAB AIA trials, including 
evaluating empirical data as presented herein. Patent litigation activity 
pertinent to fintech-related technologies can help assess the economic 
value of underlying patented technology. Given the accelerating pace 
of global patent grant activity, we may simply be living in the fintech 
litigation calm before the storm. The author acknowledges that, while 
these results are interesting on their face, they are still inconclusive and 
demand further study. 
CONCLUSION 
This article’s fundamental question —Do patents advance 
fintech innovation? — may be answered by studying the recent 
empirical data regarding fintech patents. The promised blessings of 
intellectual property (IP), including those expressed for the patent 
protection of fintech, and increasingly, blockchain-based technologies, 
are premised on its dual potential to promote innovation and to benefit 
the public. A variety of players – ranging from mature banking 
institutions, established technology names, speculative investors, 
disruptive start-ups – are making significant investments of time, 
capital, and other resources to obtain global IP rights at an increasing 
pace, as evidenced by the application and grant data for thousands of 
blockchain-related patents worldwide annually. The empirical 
evidence to date further illustrates the patent paradox described by 
many scholars. Data shows that companies are globally investing in 
fintech patents at an accelerated pace. In contrast, the evidence also 
suggests that the value of and the expected return on these fintech IP 
asset investments is presently very unclear. Despite America’s two-
century-plus experience with the patent system, patents still present 
curious questions about their utility, especially their ultimate value for 
today’s increasingly fintech and crypto-centric world.  
While fintech is still in its nascency, its dramatic rise poses 
important public policy and legal challenges for policymakers, 
regulators, and industry stakeholders. There is a long-standing and 
intense debate surrounding the incentives and the societal value of 
patents in driving innovation in any industry sector while 
simultaneously enhancing the public good. The true utility of fintech 
patents may be debated by numerous stakeholders, including 
policymakers, regulators, the courts, and the market. A vast amount of 
literature argues that historically patents have long secured valuable 
rights around innovation and in turn, are a lagging economic indicator 
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of incentivized private investment. The wealth of widely available 
empirical data is a useful tool for policymakers and regulators. The 
empirical data confirms a significant amount of surging activity among 
U.S. and global patent trends (e.g., application rates, issuances, and 
litigation). The practical reality of the premise’s conclusion may seem 
unclear, but certainly worthy of further scrutiny. Ultimately, the 
answer to these curious questions about the fintech sector’s ongoing IP 
asset obsession may be determined by how disruptive, innovative, and 
socially beneficial these patented technologies ultimately prove to be.  





The following data provides a summary of financial services-
related patents disputed in the USPTO Transitional Program for 
Covered Business Methods (CBM) during the 2020 calendar year. The 
chart provides the patent-in-dispute, the adverse parties, and other 
related case information. This sample suggests that litigation 
concerning blockchain or crypto-related patents did not arise in within 
this program during the period reviewed. 
The USPTO CBM program was designed as a temporary 
initiative and has been discontinued due to the lapse in statutory 
authority.  
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